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HIS Article provides an update of case law and legislative efforts
that have had, or will have, a significant impact on franchise and
dealership law in Texas and the Fifth Circuit. This past year saw
several significant decisions in Texas in the areas of jurisdiction, forum
selection, and venue. Interestingly, the cases were almost equally split
among parties seeking to bring actions in Texas and parties seeking to
avoid having to appear and litigate in Texas. Another area that saw note-
worthy developments was the applicability and enforceability of jury-trial
waivers. In franchise and dealership law, perhaps the most noteworthy
aspect was the lack of any material movement towards the Federal Trade
Commission's issuance of a final amended federal franchise law.1
II. PROCEDURE
A. JURISDICTION
Attempts to use the concept of fraudulent joinder to defeat diversity
jurisdiction arose in several Texas federal courts during this Survey pe-
riod. In De La Hoya v. Coldwell Banker Mexico, Inc.,2 Coldwell Banker
Mexico, Inc. and Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corporation contracted,
agreeing that CB Mexico, Inc. would act as Coldwell Banker's sub-
franchisor in Mexico. CB Mexico, Inc., "with [Coldwell Banker's] con-
* B.A., Colorado State University, 1974; M.A.T., The Colorado College, 1979; J.D.,
The University of Texas School of Law, 1990. Partner, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Dallas,
Texas.
** B.A., Trinity University, 1994; J.D. cure laude, St. Mary's University School of
Law, 1997. Associate, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Austin, Texas.
*** B.B.A., Baylor University, 1998; J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman
School of Law, 2005. Associate, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
**** B.A., Tennessee State University, magna cum laude, 2001; J.D., Thurgood Mar-
shall School of Law at Texas Southern University, magna cum laude, 2004. Associate,
Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. 16 C.F.R. §§ 436.1 et seq. (2006). The history and proposed changes to the Trade
Regulation Rule entitled "Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning
Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures," commonly referred to as the FTC Rule,
were thoroughly discussed in last year's franchise update. See Deborah S. Coldwell et al.,
Franchise Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 1035, 1055-57 (2004).
2. 125 F. App'x 533 (5th Cir. 2005).
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sent.... assigned its rights and duties under the subfranchise contract to
[Coldwell Banker Affiliates de Mexico] in 1998." 3 In 1999, CB Affiliates
de Mexico entered into a franchise agreement with Mafiana Today S. de
R.L. de C.V., granting Mafiana and its president, Luetta "LuLu" Jacob-
sen, the right to operate a Coldwell Banker franchise in Cabo San Lucas,
Mexico. The franchise agreement prohibited Mafiana from offering or
performing real-estate services, including escrow, but Mafiana could pro-
vide ancillary services as a separate business. 4
Oscar de la Hoya and several other plaintiffs allegedly engaged Ma-
fiana's services to buy and sell real estate in Baja Mexico. Plaintiffs alleg-
edly sent funds to an escrow account that Mafiana maintained pursuant to
Mafiana's instructions. LuLu allegedly misappropriated funds from this
account. Plaintiffs alleged that CB Mexico, Inc., CB Affiliates de Mexico,
and Coldwell Banker knew that LuLu had mishandled client funds in the
past and that she had misappropriated funds during the time that plain-
tiffs sent money to Mafiana. Plaintiffs brought suit in Texas state court
against CB Mexico, Inc., CB Affiliates de Mexico, Coldwell Banker,
Richard Smith of CB Mexico, Inc., and CB Affiliates de Mexico's presi-
dent. "Defendants removed [to federal district court,] claiming that CB
Mexico, Inc., Coldwell Banker, and Smith had been improperly joined to
defeat diversity."'5 The district court agreed and denied plaintiffs' motion
to remand to state court. The district court then granted CB Affiliates de
Mexico's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs
challenged the district court's findings that CB Mexico, Inc. and Smith
were improperly joined.6
In determining whether improper joinder has occurred, defendants
bear a "heavy burden"-they must show that "(1) plaintiffs fraudulently
pleaded false jurisdictional facts, or (2) there is no reasonable basis on
which the district court can predict that plaintiffs might be able to recover
against the non-diverse defendants. ' 7 In Coldwell Banker, the Fifth Cir-
cuit had to decide "whether defendants.., carried their burden of show-
ing that there [was] no reasonable basis on which the court [could]
predict that plaintiffs might recover against [CB Mexico, Inc.] and
[Smith]."
The Fifth Circuit considered that a court "may resolve whether a plain-
tiff has a reasonable basis of recovery under state law by conducting a
Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis to determine whether the complaint states a
claim . . . against the non-diverse defendant."9 The appellate court con-
cluded that if a plaintiff can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, there is no
improper joinder. In Coldwell Banker, plaintiffs claimed that CB Affili-
3. Id. at 534.
4. Id. at 533-34.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 534-35.
7. Id. at 536.
8. Id.
9. Id. (quoting Smallwood v. I1. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004)).
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ates de Mexico (the Mexican, and thus diverse defendant) was liable for
failing to control Mafiana's escrow activities despite its power to do so
and its knowledge that LuLu misappropriated funds. Plaintiffs then ar-
gued that CB Mexico, Inc. and Smith were liable for CB Affiliates de
Mexico's failure to act under the "single business enterprise" theory. Al-
though the Fifth Circuit agreed that plaintiffs presented sufficient evi-
dence to establish a reasonable basis for recovery against CB Mexico, Inc.
and Smith-including the fact that Smith owned 100% of CB Mexico,
Inc. and 1% of CB Affiliates de Mexico, and that CB Mexico, Inc. owed
the remaining 99%-the appellate court's analysis did not end there. The
Fifth Circuit had to analyze whether plaintiffs could recover against CB
Affiliates de Mexico-the party at the center of the single-enterprise the-
ory. The Fifth Circuit concluded that CB Affiliates de Mexico had suffi-
cient control over Mafiana and LuLu from the franchise agreement and
knowledge of Mafiana and LuLu's misappropriations. Consequently, the
appellate court vacated the order, dismissed CB Affiliates de Mexico for
want of personal jurisdiction, and remanded the action to state court
since the defendants failed to carry the burden of establishing the im-
proper joinder of CB Mexico, Inc. and Smith.10
In Kardell v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp.," plaintiff Patricia Kardell
entered into a five-year franchise agreement with Century 21 on Septem-
ber 30, 1999. In July 2002, Kardell attempted to sell her real property and
her Century 21 franchise to Stephen Hill, for which she had to obtain
Century 21's consent. Kardell informed Lowery Nabb, Century 21's Re-
gional Service Director, that she wanted to sell her franchise, and Nabb
informed Kardell that he could not assist her and that she would instead
need to communicate with the managers of Century 21. When Kardell
contacted the Century 21 managers, they required Hill to accept a ten-
year franchise agreement rather than the remaining two years on
Kardell's franchise agreement. As a result, Hill refused to purchased
Kardell's franchise. Kardell, therefore, sued Century 21 Real Estate Cor-
poration and Lowery Nabb for breach of contract and tortious interfer-
ence with an existing contract. 12
Century 21 and Nabb alleged that Kardell fraudulently joined Nabb for
the sole purpose of defeating diversity jurisdiction. The district court
used the same analysis as the Coldwell Banker court did to recognize im-
proper joinder: (1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or
(2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-
diverse party in state court. The district court declared that because the
only cause of action asserted against Nabb was tortious interference with
an existing contract, Kardell must be able to recover against Nabb for
that cause in state court in order to have her suit remanded. 13
10. Id. at 538-41.
11. No. SA-04-CA-510-RF, 2004 WL 2550591 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2004).
12. Id. at *1.
13. Id. at *2.
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The district court noted that to prove a claim for tortious interference
against Nabb, Kardell "would have to show (1) the existence of a contract
subject to interference, (2) the occurrence of an act of interference that
was willful and intentional, (3) that the act was a proximate cause of
plaintiff's damage, and (4) that actual damage or loss occurred.' 1 4 The
district court held that Kardell pled sufficient facts to recover against
Nabb on this claim. The district court concluded that Century 21 and
Nabb's defense argument that he (as an agent) was acting on Century
21's behalf was irrelevant since Kardell alleged that Nabb interfered with
the contract between Kardell and Hill, not the franchise agreement.
Moreover, because Kardell pled sufficient facts to show that a contract
existed between Kardell and Hill, Kardell had established a "possibility"
of recovering against Nabb. 15
Several Texas courts analyzed personal-jurisdiction issues this past
year. In Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten,16 James Holten
purchased a Coachmen RV from Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc.
Seeking a cheaper price than he could get from any of Coachmen's many
Texas dealers, Holten contacted the Coachmen factory and was informed
that a lower price could be obtained from Michiana, a Coachmen "fac-
tory outlet." Holten initiated the transaction by calling Michiana to
purchase the $64,000 RV. The Texas Supreme Court addressed whether
Holten could bring suit in Texas against Michiana based on this nonresi-
dent's alleged misrepresentations in a telephone call with Holten.17
The supreme court held that Michiana's conduct did not meet the stan-
dards for purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws. First, the supreme court noted that Michiana was located in Indi-
ana, a few miles from the Michigan border. Next, Michiana had neither
employees nor property in Texas and was not authorized to do business
here. The supreme court, however, noted that a nonresident need not
have offices or employees in a forum state in order to meet the pur-
poseful-availment test. Advertising in telephone directories in Texas cit-
ies, operating an office for sales information and support, and certain
activities over the Internet all meet this standard. Michiana did not ad-
vertise in Texas or on the Internet, and thus did not solicit business from
Holten or anyone else in Texas. The supreme court further found that
"Michiana did not place large numbers of RVs in a 'stream of commerce'
flowing to Texas," emphasizing that stream-of-commerce jurisdiction re-
quired a "stream, not a dribble."'18 The supreme court observed that both
the United States Supreme Court and the Texas Supreme Court had
14. Id. at *3.
15. Id. at *2-3 ("The job of the Court is not to conduct a mini-trial of [Kardell's] claims
but rather determine if there was ... a possibility that [Kardell] had set forth a valid cause
of action against Nabb.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).
16. 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005).
17. Id. at 778-79.
18. Id. at 768.
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"found no purposeful availment in cases involving isolated sales solicited
by consumers who proposed to use the product in a state where the de-
fendant did no business."' 9 Therefore, the supreme court reversed the
court of appeals' judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the claims
against Michiana for want of jurisdiction.
In MJCM, L.L.C. v. Sky Bank,20 the Southern District of Texas deter-
mined that conduct of a merged non-existent company, and now may be
considered when deciding jurisdiction. MJCM L.L.C., d/b/a Pinnacle Fi-
nancial Strategies, entered into three contracts with MB & T. In one of
the contracts, a marketing-materials license agreement, Pinnacle allowed
MB & T to use, among other things, its trademarks, service marks, and
copyrighted marketing materials in advertising aspects of a banking pro-
gram. MB & T subsequently merged with Sky Financial Group, Inc., with
Sky Bank as the surviving entity. Pinnacle sued Sky Bank, alleging that
MB & T, in violation of the contracts, disclosed confidential and proprie-
tary information and trade secrets before the merger. Pinnacle sued for
breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, trademark in-
fringement, theft of trade secrets and confidential and proprietary infor-
mation, unfair competition, conspiracy, and for damages under the Texas
Theft Liability Act. Sky Bank moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
Sky Bank challenged the district court's exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion on two bases. First, Sky Bank argued that it had insufficient contacts
with Texas. Second, it argued that MB & T's contacts could not be im-
puted to Sky Bank because MB & T no longer existed. The district court
disagreed. The district court held that although Sky Bank was an Ohio
corporation and did not have any contacts with Texas, MB & T had suffi-
cient contacts when executing the contracts with Pinnacle to support spe-
cific jurisdiction. The district court, moreover, held that MB & T's
contacts (although a predecessor) could be imputed to Sky Bank since
Pinnacle asserted specific personal jurisdiction over a company that, after
signing the contracts from which the dispute arose, merged into another
entity and ceased to exist. The district court noted that the "Fifth Circuit
has counseled imputation of jurisdictional contacts of a predecessor cor-
poration to its successor corporation. .". . 21 The district court, therefore,
denied Sky Bank's motion to dismiss.
It is crucial to remember that while subject-matter jurisdiction may be
raised at any time, challenges to personal jurisdiction may be waived if
not timely asserted. In Phoenix Network Technologies (Europe) Ltd. v.
Neon Systems, Inc. ,22 the plaintiff challenged the trial court's dismissal of
a state lawsuit based on a forum-selection clause. The plaintiff alleged
19. Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)).
20. No. Civ.A. H-05-0664, 2005 WL 2121549 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2005).
21. Id. at *6.
22. 177 S.W.3d 605, 609 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.) (noting that
both defendants stipulated in the trial court that they would not contest jurisdiction if suit
were brought in the proper forum).
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that the trial court erred in dismissing its claims without including a "re-
turn jurisdiction clause" in the dismissal orders. The appellate court ex-
plained that a "return jurisdiction clause" would ensure that the
defendants would not be allowed to use a forum-selection clause as a
shield to litigation in one forum, and then be allowed to assert it as a
jurisdictional defense in the second forum. The appellate court held that
the plaintiff waived this challenge to include a return jurisdiction clause
since it did not assert this defense in the trial court.23
B. CHOICE OF LAW
In El Pollo Loco, S.A. de C. V. v. El Polio Loco, Inc.,24 a Mexican and a
U.S. entity entered into an intellectual property acquisition agreement on
February 22, 1996. Before the agreement, EPL-Mexico owned the rights
in Mexico to the El Pollo Loco trademarks, trade names, copyrights,
trade secrets, trade practices, and the right to a number of franchise and
license agreements with Mexican franchisees. Under the agreement,
EPL-Mexico agreed to transfer to EPL-USA all of its rights to the intel-
lectual property, and EPL-USA gave EPL-Mexico an exclusive, royalty-
free license within specified Mexican territories to use the intellectual
property. EPL-Mexico also agreed to open twenty-five EPL stores (and
exploit the intellectual property) in Mexico over ten years and pay the
franchise fees to EPL-USA. EPL-Mexico sued EPL-USA based on con-
tract and tort claims; EPL-USA counterclaimed for breach of contract.
25
The agreement provided that Mexican law applied to all disputes that
arose in connection with contract performance. The district court noted
that the "[p]arties may agree that the law of a certain nation shall govern
their rights and duties with respect to a transaction, so long as the trans-
action bears a reasonable relation to such nation. ' 26 Further, the U.S.
Supreme Court presumes that choice-of-law clauses are valid "and has
'instructed American courts to enforce such clauses in the interests of
international comity and out of deference to the integrity and proficiency
of foreign courts." 27 The district court, therefore, held that there was a
reasonable relationship between the agreement and Mexico and that
there was "no evidence that Mexican law was contrary to a fundamental
policy of Texas," so the choice-of-law clause was valid and applicable to
the contract and tort claims. 28 Moreover, even if the choice of law did
not apply to the tort claims, Texas's choice-of-law rules and "most signifi-
cant relationship" test required that Mexican law governed EPL-Mex-
23. Id. at 609.
24. 344 F. Supp. 2d 986 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
25. Id. at 986-88.





ico's tort claims. 29
In Memon v. Baskin-Robbins Inc.,30 plaintiffs Manzoor Memon, Aamir
Memon, Sanam Memon, and Memon Corp. filed a lawsuit against Bas-
kin-Robbins, Inc., alleging various state claims stemming from a franchise
agreement between Memon Corp. and Baskin-Robbins. Baskin-Robbins
timely removed the action based on diversity and moved to dismiss all
claims against it. About four months later, plaintiffs filed a motion to
dismiss, seeking dismissal without prejudice until they could afford to re-
tain counsel. The district court granted Baskin-Robbins' motion to dis-
miss. Plaintiffs, thereafter, retained counsel and appealed the dismissal.
The Fifth Circuit found that Memon Corp.'s claims should not have been
dismissed with prejudice, and the district court, upon remand, dismissed
Memon Corp.'s claims without prejudice. 3 1
Baskin-Robbins then sought to recover attorney's fees from Memon
Corp. and Aamir Memon under the franchise agreement's fee provision.
The franchise agreement provided that the agreement: "shall be inter-
preted and construed under the laws of the state in which [Baskin-Rob-
bins] has its principal place of business .... 32
In determining which state's law governed the franchise agreement,
Baskin-Robbins indicated that it shifted its principal place of business
from California, where it was located when the parties executed the
franchise agreement, to Massachusetts, where it was located when plain-
tiffs filed suit. Because Baskin-Robbins' primary place of business
changed after the franchise agreement's execution, the district court had
to determine the meaning of the "primary place of business" provision. 33
Although Baskin-Robbins' primary place of business was in California
when the parties entered into the franchise agreement, language in the
franchise agreement indicated that the parties chose not to require Cali-
fornia law to govern the contract. The franchise agreement provided that
the "choice of law shall not include the California Franchise Relations
Act or the California Franchise Investment Law. . . ." The district court
noted that this language evidenced the parties' intent to leave open the
possibility that the law governing the contract might change after the
franchise agreement was executed. As such, the district court determined
that the parties intended Massachusetts law to govern the franchise
agreement because that was where Baskin-Robbins had its primary place
of business. 34
29. Id. at 989 (noting that the choice-of-law clause applied to the tort claims because
the clause was broad); see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.301(a) (Vernon Supp.
2005); Mitsui & Co. (USA), Inc. v. Mira M/V, 111 F.3d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1997).
30. No. Civ. A. H-03-1944, 2005 WL 1606930 (S.D. Tex. July 6, 2005).
31. Id. at *1.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at *2 (noting that the district court did not need to determine whether the
choice-of-law provision was valid because Texas and Massachusetts law similarly inter-




In Phoenix Network Technologies (Europe) Ltd. v. Neon Systems,
Inc.,35 Phoenix Network Technologies, Inc. (Computer Associates Inter-
national, Inc.'s predecessor ("CAI")) and Diplomat Systems Limited
(Phoenix Network Technologies (Europe) Ltd.'s predecessor) entered
into an agreement that granted Diplomat the "non-exclusive right to li-
cense, sub-license, market, distribute and support" particular software
within certain European countries. Phoenix and Diplomat had entered
into this agreement in 1996. In 1997, Sterling Silver, Inc., which later
merged with CAI, purchased Phoenix assets, including the agreement.
Three years later, Neon Systems, Inc. contracted with Sterling to acquire
certain rights to the software. Because Phoenix declared that it had supe-
rior rights to Neon in the agreement, Phoenix sued Neon and CAI in
January 2003, alleging tortious interference with the agreement and with
Phoenix's prospective business relations and unfair competition. 36
Neon and CAI moved to dismiss Phoenix's claims since Phoenix had
filed the lawsuit in Fort Bend County, Texas. Neon and CAI asserted
that the agreement's forum-selection clause mandated that any dispute be
construed under English laws. The trial court granted both Neon and
CAI's motions and dismissed all claims without prejudice. Phoenix
appealed.37
The agreement contained the following forum-selection clause: "The
parties hereby agree that this Agreement and the provisions hereof shall
be construed in accordance with English law and the venue for resolution
of any disputes arising out of this Agreement shall be the United
Kingdom." 38
Phoenix, an English company headquartered in the U.K., asserted that
this clause was either invalid or unenforceable. Phoenix argued that: (1)
Neon and CAI did not carry their burden of showing that Phoenix and
CAI agreed that the U.K. would be the exclusive jurisdiction; (2) parol
evidence indicated that the forum-selection clause did not show the par-
ties' intent to litigate exclusively in the U.K.; (3) alternatively, if the fo-
rum-selection clause provided for exclusive jurisdiction in the U.K., the
clause was invalid for having been the result of mutual mistake; (4) Neon
and CAI did not show that various jurisdiction would enforce forum-se-
lection clauses; (5) the forum-selection clause was vague; and (6) the fo-
rum-selection clause violated Texas public policy. The appellate court
first outlined the two tests for determining forum-selection clauses'
enforceability.39
Since the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in MIS Bremen v.
35. 177 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.).
36. Id. at 609.
37. Id. at 609-10.
38. Id. at 610.
39. Id. at 614.
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Zapata Off-Shore Co.40 and its later refining pronouncements in Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,41 Texas courts have been more apt to enforce
forum-selection clauses. Under the test of MIS Bremen and Shute, forum-
selection clauses "are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless
enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under
the circumstances." In contrast, Texas appellate courts had recognized a
two-part test to determine whether a forum-selection clause was valid
and enforceable: the clause was enforceable if (1) the parties contractu-
ally consented to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of another jurisdic-
tion and (2) the other jurisdiction generally recognized the validity of
such provisions. Even if these two threshold criteria were met, however,
a forum-selection clause would not bind a Texas court if the interests of
witnesses and public policy strongly favored that the suit be maintained in
a forum other than the one to which the parties had agreed. The Phoenix
court noted that the principal differences between the M/S Bremen and
Shute test and the Texas appellate court test were that (1) the former test
viewed the clause as prima facie valid, while the Texas test required the
clause's proponent to establish that the forum recognized the validity of
the general type of forum-selection clause, and (2) the former test al-
lowed the opponent to defeat the clause if the enforcement was unrea-
sonable and unjust, while the Texas test did not expressly recognize this
enforcement exception. The supreme court has since clarified the en-
forceability of forum-selection clauses in Texas. 42
In In re AIU Ins. Co.,43 the supreme court approved the MIS Bremen
and Shute test when it held that the party opposing enforcement of the
forum-selection clause had the "heavy burden" of showing that the clause
should not be enforced under the MIS Bremen and Shute test. In the
same year, the supreme court affirmed application of the MIS Bremen
and Shute test in In re Automated Collection Technologies, Inc.44 In that
case, the supreme court held that enforcement of forum-selection clauses
is mandatory unless the party opposing enforcement clearly shows that
enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust.45
In Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten,46 which was discussed
above, the Texas Supreme Court again affirmed the application of the
MIS Bremen and Shute test. Holten and Michiana signed a one-page con-
tract that provided that any litigation between them would occur in Indi-
ana. Holten, nevertheless, sued Michiana in a Texas state court. The
40. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
41. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
42. Id. (citing My Caf6-CCC, Ltd. v. Lunchstop, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 860, 864-65 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.); Holeman v. Nat'l Bus. Inst. Inc., 94 S.W.3d 91, 97 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38
S.W.3d 200, 203 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, pet. denied); Mabon Ltd. v. Afri-Carib En-
ters., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 291, 296-97 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.)).
43. 148 S.W.3d 109, 111 (Tex. 2004).
44. 156 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. 2004).
45. Phoenix Network Techs., 177 S.W.3d at 613-14.
46. 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005).
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supreme court, using the analysis in Shute, held that insertion of a clause
designating a foreign forum suggested that the parties intended no local
availment. 47 Holten challenged application of the forum-selection clause.
First, Holten asserted that Michiana waived the forum-selection clause
because Michiana did not initially raise this issue. The supreme court
held that Holten was not prejudiced by the delay since nothing had taken
place in the first two years of the lawsuit except for the special appear-
ance. Second, the supreme court held that the clause applied to any dis-
pute, not just to disputes interpreting the terms of the contract as Holten
alleged. Lastly, the supreme court held that because Holten did not as-
sert that the clause was fraudulently induced, Michiana was not required
to show that enforcement of the clause would be unreasonable and un-
just. As such, the Phoenix court analyzed enforceability of the forum-
selection clause using the MIS Bremen and Shute test.48
The appellate court held that the forum-selection clause in the distribu-
tion agreement could not more plainly require that any disputes arising
out of the agreement be litigated in the U.K. The appellate court con-
cluded that parol evidence would not be considered in interpreting the
clause since it was not ambiguous and included a merger clause. Moreo-
ver, the appellate court did not require Neon and CAI to show that the
U.K. recognized the validity of forum-selection clauses in general. Cur-
rent Texas precedent established that the forum-selection clause would be
prima facie valid. Lastly, the appellate court held that Phoenix, which
had a "heavy burden" to make a "strong showing" that the clause should
be set aside, presented no evidence that Texas's public policy is violated
by enforcing the clause. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the
dismissal of Phoenix's claims and required the parties to litigate in the
U.K.
4 9
In Klinghoffer v. Mama Fu's Noodle House, Inc.,5° Larry Klinghoffer
and James Hammond, through their limited partnership, Asian-American
Casual Dining, L.P., executed a market-development agreement with
Mama Fu's Noodle House, Inc. The agreement contained a forum-selec-
tion that provided: "[AACD] hereby submits to the non-exclusive juris-
diction of the courts having jurisdiction in the County of Fulton State of
Georgia, and agrees not to raise and waives any objection based upon
forum non conveniens.' ' 51 The limited partnership and Mama Fu's also
entered into a franchise agreement, agreeing that: "Except to the extent
Mama Fu's seeks injunctive or other equitable relief . . . , any dispute
between Mama Fu's and Franchisee arising out of or relating to this
Agreement shall, on request of Mama Fu's or Franchisee, be determined
by arbitration . . . in Atlanta, Georgia .... "52 On the same day, an
47. Id. at 792.
48. Phoenix Network Techs., 177 S.W.3d at 614-22.
49. Id. at 621.
50. No. 3-04-CV-1695-L, 2004 WL 2583632 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2004).




amendment to the franchise agreement clarified that the market-develop-
ment agreement and franchise agreement were subject to the terms and
conditions of an earlier agreement between plaintiffs and Mama Fu's af-
filiate. This supplemental agreement also contained a forum-selection
clause: "Each party agrees that any legal action ... that arises out of or is
related to this Agreement may only be brought in the courts of the State
of Georgia or of the United States of America for the Northern District
of Georgia .... -53 The amendment specifically provided that the supple-
mental market-development agreement superseded any inconsistent pro-
visions in the franchise agreement and market-development agreement. 54
In June 2004, plaintiffs filed a demand for arbitration in Atlanta, Geor-
gia against Mama Fu's for claims including violations of the Texas Busi-
ness Opportunity Act, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of
contract. In August 2004, plaintiffs asserted "nearly identical" claims
against Mama Fu's in the instant lawsuit. Mama Fu's moved to dismiss,
asserting that Texas was not a proper venue since the supplemental mar-
ket-development agreement required the parties to litigate in Georgia.
Conversely, plaintiffs moved to stay the Texas lawsuit and compel arbitra-
tion. Plaintiffs asserted that the provision in the supplemental agreement
did not apply since it only applied to claims arising from or out of that
agreement. Plaintiffs argued that their claims arose from and related to
the original market-development agreement and franchise agreement.
The district court considered whether the forum-selection clause in the
supplemental agreement applied to claims brought under the original
market-development agreement and franchise agreement. 55
The district court noted that the supplemental agreement provided that
it superseded any inconsistent provisions in the franchise agreement and
original market-development agreement. The district court found that
the dispute-resolution provision of the supplemental agreement plainly
conflicted with the one in the franchise agreement-the supplemental
agreement contemplated litigation in Georgia state or federal court and
the franchise agreement contemplated arbitration. The district court,
therefore, held that the forum-selection clause in the supplemental mar-
ket-development agreement applied to the Texas dispute and trumped
the arbitration provision in the franchise agreement. 56
After the district court determined that the forum-selection clause in
the supplemental market-development agreement controlled, the court
decided whether the clause was enforceable. In making this determina-
tion, the district court noted that the deference accorded to a forum-se-
lection clause depends on whether the movant files a motion to dismiss
for improper venue or a motion to transfer. Using the analysis in MIS
Bremen, the district court held that a forum-selection clause is "prima
53. Id.
54. Id. at *1-2.




facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the
resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances. '57
The district court held that enforcement of a forum-selection clause
may be unreasonable when: (1) incorporation of the clause into the
agreement was the product of fraud or overreaching; (2) the party seek-
ing to escape enforcement will be deprived of his day in court because of
the grave inconvenience or unfairness of the selected forum; (3) the fun-
damental unfairness of the chosen law will deprive the plaintiff of a rem-
edy; or (4) enforcement of the forum-selection clause would contravene a
strong public policy of the forum state. Because plaintiffs failed to argue
and present evidence that the forum-selection clause was unreasonable,
the district court held that the plain language of the clause required the
parties to litigate their dispute in a Georgia state or federal court.
D. JURY-WAIVER PROVISIONS
In In re C-Span Entertainment, Inc.,58 Blockbuster, C-Span Entertain-
ment, Inc., and Sunil Dharod negotiated an asset-sale agreement whereby
C-Span would purchase the assets and operations of eleven of Blockbus-
ter's company-owned stores in East Texas. Three days later, the parties
executed Blockbuster's standard-form franchise agreements for the
eleven stores. Each franchise agreement provided that the parties waived
their right to a jury trial: "COMPANY AND FRANCHISEE AND
EACH OWNER BY EXECUTION OF THIS AGREEMENT IRREV-
OCABLY WAIVE TRIAL BY JURY ON ANY ACTION, PROCEED-
ING OR COUNTERCLAIM, WHETHER AT LAW OR EQUITY,
BROUGHT BY EITHER OF THEM. ' 59 The asset-sale agreement,
however, did not contain a jury waiver.
On June 8, 2001, C-Span sued Blockbuster, asserting both tort and con-
tract claims. C-Span alleged that Blockbuster did not provide accurate
financial information during the negotiations. C-Span eventually joined
its attorneys during these transactions, Akin Gump, and filed a claim
against them for malpractice. During the litigation, the trial court en-
tered seven scheduling orders that included a date for a jury trial setting.
After the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re Prudential,60
Blockbuster moved to quash C-Span's jury demand, relying on the jury-
waiver provisions in the franchise agreements and In re Prudential's pro-
nouncement that the supreme court would enforce pre-litigation jury
waivers. Akin Gump also filed a motion to quash C-Span's jury demand,
seeking that all claims be tried together in a single proceeding. The trial
court granted Blockbuster's motion to quash and denied Akin Gump's
57. Id. at *3 (quoting MIS Breman, 407 U.S. at 10).
58. 162 S.W.3d 422 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.). Haynes and Boone, LLP is
lead counsel for Blockbuster in this matter.
59. Id. at 424 (emphasis in original).
60. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004).
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motion, and C-Span and Akin Gump sought mandamus relief.61
First, C-Span argued that Blockbuster had waived its right to enforce
the jury-waiver provision since over two years had passed. The appellate
court, however, held that the facts did not yield the conclusion that
Blockbuster had waived its right to enforce the contractual jury waiver.
The appellate court further held that it was not unreasonable for Block-
buster to wait to enforce the contractual jury waiver, since the issue of
pre-litigation jury waivers was a matter of first impression for the su-
preme court.
Second, C-Span argued that the district court abused its discretion by
concluding that jury-waiver provisions in the franchise agreements ap-
plied to claims arising under the asset-sale agreement. The appellate
court disagreed. The appellate court held that although it contained an
integration clause, the asset-sale agreement clearly contemplated and
participated in the franchise agreements. The appellate court concluded
that the asset-sale agreement and the franchise agreements "were part of
the same transaction and, therefore, must be construed together." The
appellate court further concluded that the asset-sale agreement incorpo-
rated the jury waiver in the franchise agreements. 62
Akin Gump argued that it should be able to rely on the jury-waiver
provision for contractual and equitable reasons. First, Akin Gump as-
serted that as C-Span's attorney and agent, Akin Gump should be bound
to the jury-waiver provision. Akin Gump relied on several arbitration
cases, "wherein an agent was bound by the same agreement to arbitrate
that bound the agent's principal." 63 The appellate court, however, held
that the arbitration cases were distinguishable. The appellate court held
that in the arbitration cases, the agent was held to the principal's agree-
ment since the agent acted on the principal's behalf in the conduct at
issue in the case. Second, Akin Gump argued that it should benefit from
the jury waiver since any other result would "set the stage for the inevita-
ble consequence of inconsistent results at trial." 64 The appellate court
held that the trial court could properly determine the issue differently
using different procedures. Hence, the appellate court denied Akin
Gump's relief.65
61. C-Span, 162 S.W.3d at 425.
62. Id. at 427.
63. Id. at 428.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 428-29; see also McMillan v. Computer Translation Sys. & Support, Inc., 66
S.W.3d 477, 482-83 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet. h.) (arbitration case wherein agent
would be entitled to arbitrate disputes arising out of specific conduct since the principal
would be entitled to do the same).
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Ill. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP, TERMINATION,
AND NON-RENEWAL
A. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
In Texas Motor Coach, L.C. v. Blue Bird Body Co.,66 the court reaf-
firmed previous Texas court decisions, holding that the relationship be-
tween a franchisee and a franchisor will be limited to the terms and
provisions contained in the franchise agreement if the agreement includes
a merger clause that the parties negotiated at arm's length. In this case, a
recreational vehicle franchisee, Texas Motor, sued its franchisor, Blue
Bird, alleging breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, fraud, violations
of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and negligent misrepresenta-
tion. These claims stemmed from numerous statements allegedly made by
Blue Bird before it executed a franchise agreement with Texas Motor.
Texas Motor claimed that its decision to sign the franchise agreement was
based on Blue Bird's false or misleading statements, including statements
by Blue Bird's representatives regarding the marketing assistance, techni-
cal support, product improvements, training, and customer service pro-
vided by the franchisor. Blue Bird also allegedly told Texas Motor that
the company had built a new factory, hired new engineers, converted to a
Japanese-type production process, abandoned the school-bus chassis, and
would comply with ISO 9000 standards, but it failed to mention that it
was not currently producing vehicles. 67 The first shipment of purportedly
new manufactured recreational vehicles sent to Texas Motor by Blue Bird
were in fact old models and contained numerous defects, including,
among other things, structural cracks in the side walls, old tires, engine
rust, and electrical malfunctions. 68 Texas Motor rejected the defective
vehicles, ceased operation shortly thereafter, and filed suit against Blue
Bird.
Blue Bird filed a motion for summary judgment on the tort claims, ar-
guing that Texas Motor could not rely on the alleged pre-contractual
statements and representations made by Blue Bird's agents because the
merger clause in the franchise agreement clearly stated that there were
no representations except as expressly set forth in the agreement and that
no one was authorized by Blue Bird to make additional representations. 69
The court looked to the merger-clause analysis set out in the Texas Su-
preme Court's decision in Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Swanson70
for guidance in determining whether the merger clause precluded reli-
ance by Texas Motor. The Schlumberger analysis included the following
factors: (a) whether counsel represented the parties, (b) whether the
agreement was negotiated at arm's length, and (c) whether the parties
were sophisticated business people. The court found that the evidence in
66. No. 4:05CV34, 2005 WL 3132482 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2005).
67. Id. at *1.
68. Id. at *2.
69. Id. at *7.
70. 959 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1997).
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this case supported the conclusion that the merger clause effectively pre-
vented reliance by Texas Motor. The court pointed to the fact that Texas
Motor was represented by counsel in negotiating the agreement and that
the merger clause was not boiler-plate language in a form contract. Texas
Motor also acknowledged that it was wary of entering into an agreement
with Blue Bird because of the decline in Blue Bird's reputation resulting
from changes in the way it constructed its vehicles, and Texas Motor in-
spected, and pointed out several defects in, a prototype of Blue Bird's
new vehicle (Blue Bird indicated that the prototype's defects would be
worked out in the final production model). These incidents led Texas Mo-
tor to seek out alternatives to becoming a Blue Bird franchisee, but ulti-
mately, the company decided to sign the franchise agreement. Given
these facts, the court recommended that Blue Bird's motion for summary
judgment be granted and that the cause of action be dismissed with
prejudice.7 1
In Texas Taco Cabana L.P. v. Taco Cabana of New Mexico, Inc.,72 a
Taco Cabana franchisee claimed that its 1994 license agreement granted it
exclusivity for the operation of Taco Cabana restaurants throughout the
entire city of Albuquerque, New Mexico. The franchisor maintained that
the exclusivity granted under the license agreement granted only a two-
mile exclusive area around the franchisee's restaurant. The agreement's
granting clause stated that the "location" of the "site" was Albuquerque,
New Mexico, as more particularly described in "Exhibit B" to the agree-
ment. However, no "Exhibit B" was attached to the agreement. The
agreement contained an exclusivity provision prohibiting the franchisor
from operating or allowing others to operate a Taco Cabana restaurant
within a radius of two miles of the site of the licensed business. The court
noted, however, that there were "numerous word processor 'strike outs'
and additions" throughout the executed agreement. 73 Subsequently, a li-
cense agreement was prepared that eliminated the strike outs and in-
cluded the additions marked in the 1994 license agreement. This finalized
draft included a granting clause that listed the site's location as 6500 San
Mateo, Albuquerque, New Mexico; however, the completed agreement
was never executed, and no attempt was made to execute it.74
The franchisee opened a Taco Cabana restaurant at 6500 San Mateo
and by the end of 1995 opened a second restaurant in Albuquerque. No
license agreement was executed in connection with the second restau-
rant's opening. From 1988 to 2001, the franchisee had certain develop-
ment rights for New Mexico under a development agreement with the
franchisor, but all such development rights terminated in November 2001.
In 2004, the franchisor opened a company-operated Taco Cabana restau-
rant in Albuquerque, but it was not located within two miles of either of
71. Tex. Motor Coach, 2005 WL 3132482, at *8.
72. No. Civ.A. SA-02-CV-1209, 2005 WL 1397032 (W.D. Tex. June 10, 2005).
73. Id. at *3.
74. Id. at *4.
2006] 1363
SMU LAW REVIEW
the franchisee's restaurants. The franchisee brought suit claiming that the
1994 license agreement granted exclusivity for a two-mile radius around
the city of Albuquerque. 75 The franchisee claimed that such an interpre-
tation was consistent with the parties' intent when the agreement was
signed and was warranted based on the agreement's plain language. The
franchisor countered that the license agreement made clear that it pro-
vided for the operation of only one restaurant at a given location and was
not meant to grant any rights to an entire city. The franchisor argued that
the agreement's only reasonable interpretation was that the restaurant's
location was meant to be filled in at a later date, and the exclusivity provi-
sion was meant to extend only to the two-mile area surrounding the
restaurant. 76
In reaching its decision, the district court pointed out that under Texas
law, ' [a] contract is ambiguous only if there is uncertainty as to which of
two reasonable interpretations is correct. '77 Here, the court found that
the contract's only reasonable interpretation was the one that the
franchisor proposed. The court noted that the 1994 license agreement's
language indicated in several places that it was meant to cover only one
restaurant at a given location. In addition, the 1994 development agree-
ment (which was prepared at the same time as the 1994 license agree-
ment) references the "License Agreement executed concurrently
herewith for the previously approved location at 6500 San Mateo, Albu-
querque, New Mexico."'78 The language of the development agreement
also made clear that each Taco Cabana restaurant contemplated thereun-
der was to be operated under a separate license agreement (even though
in practice the franchisor did not always enforce this provision). Further-
more, the license agreement's granting clause included a blank before the
words "Albuquerque, New Mexico," indicating that the parties antici-
pated something more. The court also opined that a franchisor would be
unlikely to grant exclusivity for an entire city for the relatively low
$50,000 initial fee charged under the license agreement. Based on the
agreement's language and the parties' course of conduct, the court en-
tered judgment in favor of the franchisor and dismissed franchisee's ac-
tion on the merits.
B. TERMINATION AND NON-RENEWAL
Buddy Gregg Motor Homes, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Board of the Texas
Department of Transportation79 addressed a motor-home franchisee's
claims against its franchisor brought in connection with the termination
of their franchise agreement. Buddy Gregg operated as a franchisee of
Liberty for seven years. When the relationship soured, Liberty attempted
75. Id. at *5.
76. Id. at *6.
77. Id. (citing Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sturrock, 146 S.W.3d 123, 126 (Tex.
2004)).
78. Id. at *7-8.
79. 179 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied).
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to terminate the franchise agreement but failed to comply with the termi-
nation requirements (including sixty days' notice to the dealer/franchisee
setting forth the grounds for termination) provided for in the Texas Occu-
pations Code for terminating a motor-vehicle franchise agreement. 80
Subsequently, Buddy Gregg demanded that Liberty repurchase all of
Buddy Gregg's unsold inventory pursuant to its rights under the Texas
Occupations Code.81 Liberty complied with the demand, but Buddy
Gregg later filed a formal complaint with the Motor Vehicle Board of the
Texas Department of Transportation. After considering the evidence, the
Board determined that both parties had breached their duty of good faith
and fair dealing, that Liberty should be penalized for failing to comply
with the Texas Occupations Code's termination requirements (the Board
assessed a $1,000 penalty against Liberty), that Buddy Gregg's demand
for repurchase constituted a de facto termination of the franchise agree-
ment, and that Liberty's repurchase of the inventory was timely. Both
parties appealed the Board's order. 82 The appellate court agreed with
the Board and upheld its order in full. In affirming the Board's order, the
court pointed out that despite Buddy Gregg's arguments to the contrary,
the Board has broad and exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the sale of mo-
tor vehicles, and while courts may review the Board's orders if the parties
request it, the court "cannot modify an agency order without usurping the
agency's authority and thereby violating the separation of powers
doctrine. 83
Franchisors are frequently confronted with legal challenges from fran-
chisees when they attempt to terminate a franchise too quickly or without
just cause, but in De La Hoya v. Coldwell Banker Mexico, Inc.,84 a
franchisor was brought into a lawsuit as the result of its failure to timely
terminate a troublesome franchisee. De La Hoya involved claims by sev-
eral real-estate purchasers against Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corpora-
tion, an American real-estate-brokerage franchisor, its Mexican
subfranchisor (and its assignee), a Mexican franchisee, and the sub-
franchisor's President and owner for Mafianas misappropriation of cus-
tomer's money.
On appeal, the plaintiffs alleged that CB Affiliates de Mexico exercised
control over Mafiana and thus could be held liable for Mafiana's actions.
Under the franchise agreement, Mafiana was required to keep records of
its escrow activities, and the agreement gave CB Affiliates de Mexico the
right to inspect those records and terminate the franchise for good cause.
Defendants argued that the franchise agreement did not permit CB Affil-
iates de Mexico to control Mafiana's escrow activities, so the defendants
could not be held liable for those activities. However, the court noted
80. Id. at 593; see TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2301.453(c) (West 2004).
81. Gregg, 179 S.W.3d at 593; see TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2301.465(b) (Vernon 2004).
82. Gregg, 179 S.W.3d at 598-601.
83. Id. at 603 (citing City of Stephenville v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't, 940 S.W.2d
667, 678 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. denied)).
84. 125 F. App'x 533 (5th Cir. 2005) (see discussion supra note 2).
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that evidence presented by the plaintiffs showed that "Coldwell Banker"
(presumably the subfranchisor) had exercised control over the escrow
services by requiring Jacobsen to sign an agreement requiring her to use
only third party escrow services after Coldwell Banker learned of her
prior misappropriations. Plaintiffs also presented evidence that CB Affil-
iates de Mexico had received customer complaints alerting them to Jacob-
sen's activities more than one year before the franchise agreement was
finally terminated in December 2001. In light of CB Affiliates de Mex-
ico's knowledge of Mafiana's activities, the court held that CB Affiliates
de Mexico arguably had a right of control resulting from the terms of the
franchise agreements, CB Affiliates de Mexico's attempt to exercise con-
trol over the escrow activities, or a combination of the two. As a result,
CB Affiliates de Mexico arguably breached its duty to act to protect the
plaintiffs and its failure to act could possibly point to negligence.8 5 The
court also found that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged a "single busi-




In re Schlotzsky's, Inc. v. Titterington's Deli Co. 86 exemplifies the im-
portance of trademarks and other proprietary information in the context
of the franchise relationship. The case involved a bankrupt restaurant
franchisor's motion for a preliminary injunction against a group of Den-
ver based former franchisees that continued to use the franchisor's trade-
mark, tradename, proprietary information, and operating system after
unilaterally terminating their agreements with the franchisor. Although
the twelve restaurants continued to operate under the franchisor's marks,
several displayed a flier indicating that they were converting from the
franchisor's brand of restaurants into a new restaurant chain. These ac-
tions specifically violated the non-competition covenants in their
franchise agreements.
After a hearing, the federal bankruptcy court concluded that the
franchisor would be irreparably harmed by the continued use of the
trademarks. Amounting the former franchisee's actions to simple theft,
the court granted the preliminary injunction, opining that the franchisor
was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that the franchisees were
violating the non-competition covenants.
85. Id. at 540-41.
86. No. 04-54504-LMC, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) % 12,941 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5,
2004). Haynes and Boone, LLP was lead bankruptcy counsel for Schlotzsky's, Inc. and its
affiliates and subsidiaries; co-author Robert A. Lauer served as Corporate Counsel for






Because the franchise relationship relies heavily on the parties' written
franchise agreement, each provision requires particular attention to de-
tail. Miron v. Sloan87 is a good example of the negative effects of a
broadly constructed arbitration clause. In this case, a group of franchis-
ees sued a dry cleaning franchisor for fraud in the inducement, negligent
misrepresentation, breach of the franchise agreement, and violation of
state consumer-protection statutes. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that
they entered into franchise agreements for dry-cleaning businesses based
on offering circulars that misrepresented and omitted material informa-
tion about the franchises. Defendant responded by moving to stay the
action under the Federal Arbitration Act and filing a demand for arbitra-
tion with the American Arbitration Association.
The franchise agreements contained the following arbitration
provision:
The parties agree that, except as precluded by applicable law, any
controversy or claim that arises out of or relates to this Agreement,
or any breach of this Agreement, including but not limited to, any
claim that any of this Agreement is invalid, illegal, voidable or void,
shall be submitted to a sole arbitrator in accordance with the rules of
the American Arbitration Association and judgment upon the award
may be entered in any court with jurisdiction thereof.88
Plaintiffs made several arguments in opposition to the motion. 89 Plain-
tiffs first argued that they were not required to arbitrate under the
franchise agreements because the franchisor under those agreements was
a dissolved corporation at the time of contracting and therefore did not
have the power to enter into contract. Responding to this argument, the
court relied on the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Will-Drill Resources, Inc. v.
Samson Resources Co.90 If plaintiffs had argued that the arbitration
clause alone was voidable, it would have been within the court's authority
to determine whether there was an agreement to arbitrate. But according
to Will-Drill, an attempt to have an entire agreement declared voidable
or void is a decision for the arbitrator. 91
Plaintiffs' argued secondly that their claims arose out of the disclosure
circulars rather than the franchise agreements and were not covered by
the arbitration clause. The court, however, interpreted the arbitration
clause in the franchise agreement broadly. Specifically, it held that be-
cause the clause covered "any controversy or claim that arises out of or
relates to the [f]ranchise [a]greements or any breach of the
87. No. H-04-4289, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 13,101 (S.D. Tex. May 13, 2005).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 352 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2003).
91. Id. at 218.
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[a]greements," it did in fact cover the asserted claims.92
Plaintiffs' final argument centered on the fact that defendant Sloan
founded the dry-cleaning business and later incorporated it in Florida.
After operating as a corporation for several years, Sloan dissolved the
Florida corporation and continued the business as a sole proprietor
before incorporating again three years later. Because the original
franchise agreements were with the dissolved corporation, plaintiffs ar-
gued that there was not a contractual obligation to arbitrate with either
Sloan or the newer corporation because neither were signatories to the
agreements.
Whether parties who did not sign the contract containing the arbitra-
tion provision may invoke the agreement against a party is a matter for
the court to decide. 93 There is a two-prong test for determining whether
a nonsignatory can compel arbitration: (1) When a signatory to the agree-
ment containing the arbitration clause must rely on the terms of the writ-
ten agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory; and (2)
when the signatory raises allegations of substantially interdependent and
concerted misconduct by both a nonsignatory and one or more signato-
ries to the agreement.94 In this case, the court recognized that because
plaintiffs were relying on the franchise agreements with the arbitration
clause as a basis for recovery, the first prong was satisfied. Also, the
court held that the second prong could be established. Recognizing that
neither Sloan nor the newer corporation were signatories, the court ruled
that because Sloan operated essentially a single business throughout the
course of the franchise relationship, the signatory plaintiffs were alleging
interdependent and concerted misconduct by both a nonsignatory and
one or more signatories to the contract. Therefore, the court concluded
that the arbitration clause was enforceable by all defendants.
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Franchisors remain cautious regarding the amount of control exercised
over franchisee operations due to the potential exposure to third-party
claims, particularly vicarious-liability claims. Unlike most vicarious-lia-
bility cases, Acosta v. Drury Inns, Inc.95 recently addressed the agency-
law issues on a motion to remand. In this case, the plaintiff was a Texas
citizen who filed a state law claim against Drury Inns, a hotel-manage-
ment company, and Drury Southwest, a hotel franchisor, alleging discrim-
ination and retaliation in violation of the Texas Commission on Human
Rights Act arising from her pregnancy. Defendants removed the case to
federal court based on diversity, despite the fact that Drury Southwest
maintained its principal place of business in Texas. On plaintiff's motion
92. Miron, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 13.101.
93. Id. (citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546-47 (1964)).
94. Id. (citing Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1013 (2000)).
95. 400 F. Supp. 2d 916 (W.D. Tex. 2005).
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to remand, defendants argued that Drury Southwest was fraudulently
joined and, therefore, once removed, complete diversity existed.
Plaintiff's motion for remand was based on the theory that Drury Inns
and Drury Southwest were "joint employers." Determining whether dis-
tinct entities are "joint employers" of an individual requires the court to
consider "(1) the interrelation of operations; (2) centralized control of
labor relations; (3) common management; and (4) common ownership or
financial control. ' 96 Of critical importance is which entity made the final
decision regarding employment matters. While Drury Southwest owned
the real estate, building, and franchise rights of the hotel at issue, it con-
tracted with Drury Inns to manage and operate every aspect of the hotel.
In light of this evidence and because plaintiff failed to plead any facts
showing that Drury Southwest had the right to hire or fire her, the right
to supervise or set her work schedule, or that Drury Southwest paid her
salary, withheld any taxes, provided any benefits, or set any terms and
conditions of her employment, the court determined that Drury South-
west was fraudulently joined and denied plaintiff's motion for remand.
C. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
In response to an application for a preliminary injunction, a federal
district court analyzed the merits of a counterclaim alleging that a restau-
rant franchisor tortiously interfered with a supply-chain manager's sup-
plier and distributor contracts. 97 Plaintiff Schlotzsky's became the new
Schlotzsky's Deli franchisor and owner of all Schlotzsky's trademarks and
associated rights following an auction of Schlotzsky's, Inc.'s bankruptcy
estate. As the new franchisor, the plaintiff had the right to set quality
standards for the franchise system as well as the right to approve all sup-
pliers and distributors of Schlotzsky's-branded products. After the plain-
tiff designated two other primary distributors, the defendant
misrepresented itself to be the exclusive representative in the purchasing
of products for Schlotzsky's Inc. and Schlotzsky's Independent Franchise
Association. The plaintiff argued that the defendant's behavior
threatened to dilute Schlotzsky's trademarks by introducing inconsistency
and inferior products into the franchise system. In response, the defen-
dant moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the plaintiff from con-
tinuing its efforts to exclude the defendant from participating in the
Schlotzsky's distribution chain.
In one of several counterclaims, the defendant alleged that Schlotzsky's
tortiously interfered with its supplier and distributor contracts. The ele-
ments of tortious interference with an existing contract are: (1) the plain-
tiff had a valid contract; (2) the defendant willfully and intentionally
interfered with the contract; (3) the interference was a proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injury; and (4) the plaintiff incurred actual damage or
96. Id. (citing Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 404 (5th Cir. 1983)).
97. Schlotzsky's, Ltd. v. Sterling Purchasing & Nat'l Distrib. Co., No. A-05-CA-95-SS,
Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 13,089 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2005).
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loss. 98 The defendant to such a claim can assert the affirmative defenses
of privilege or legal justification in the interference of contractual rela-
tions. Determining the validity of these defenses is a question of law. 99
A defendant is justified in interfering with a plaintiff's contract if it
exercises: (1) its own legal rights; or (2) a good-faith claim to a colorable
legal right, even though that claim ultimately proves to be mistaken. De-
termining justification can be established as a matter of law when the acts
that plaintiff complains of as tortious interference are merely the defen-
dant's exercise of its own contractual rights. Intent is irrelevant. 100 Rely-
ing on this analysis, the court found that Schlotzsky's exercised its
authority as franchisor and trademark owner to designate two primary
sources from which franchisees could purchase Schlotzsky's branded, pro-
prietary, and logoed products and, therefore, the defendant's counter-
claim did not sufficiently demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits.
In addition to its counterclaim for tortious interference with an existing
contract, the defendant also claimed that the plaintiff tortiously inter-
fered with prospective business relations. The elements of this cause of
action are: (1) there was a reasonable probability that the plaintiff would
have entered into a business relationship with a third person; (2) the de-
fendant intentionally interfered with the relationship; (3) the defendant's
conduct was independently tortious or unlawful; (4) the interference was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury; and (5) the plaintiff suffered
actual damages or loss. 10 1 The court similarly rejected this claim on
grounds that it was not apparent that Schlotzsky's committed any inde-
pendently tortious or unlawful act, but had only exercised its rights as a
franchisor.10 2
VI. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACr
Last year saw rounds three and four of Texas Taco Cabana L.P. v. Taco
Cabana of New Mexico, Inc.10 3 The franchisor of the Taco Cabana
franchise system previously entered into a series of agreements with a
New Mexico franchisee, including a 1988 development agreement, a 1994
development agreement, a 1994 license agreement, and a 2000 amend-
ment-to-development agreement. However, the franchisee had only de-
veloped two restaurants and the franchisor ultimately declared that all
98. Id. (citing Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 207 (Tex. 2002)).
99. Id. (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Review Servs., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77-78
(Tex. 2000)).
100. Id. (citing Calvillo v. Gonzalez, 922 S.W.2d 928, 929 (Tex. 1996)).
101. Id. (citing Allied Capital Corp. v. Cravens, 67 S.W.3d 486, 490-91 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2002, no pet. h.)).
102. Id.
103. Tex. Taco Cabana, L.P. v. Taco Cabana of N.M., No. Civ. A. SA-02-CV-1209, 2005
WL 356829 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2005); Tex. Taco Cabana, L.P., 2005 WL 1397032, at *1.
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development rights had expired. The franchisor then brought suit for de-
claratory judgment as to the agreements' validity, and the franchisee in
turn filed counterclaims for, among other things, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with con-
tract and prospective contractual relationships, breach of contract, and
violations of the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act and the Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA"). In round one, the court dismissed
the franchisee's claims under the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act and
its claims for tortious interference with contract and prospective contrac-
tual relations claims. But it elected not to dismiss the franchisee's claims
under the Texas DTPA on grounds that (a) the franchisee's claims were
based on alleged deceptive acts of the franchisor beyond just a disagree-
ment of interpretation, and (b) reliance had not been waived.' 0 4 In round
two, however, the court found that there was simply a disagreement over
the interpretation of the contract, which was not actionable under the
Texas DTPA, and granted summary judgment in favor of the
franchisor. 10 5
In round three, the court heard the remaining declaratory-relief and
contract claims. 106 The franchisor sought a declaration that all of the
agreements had expired or were invalid, and the franchisee sought a dec-
laration that the agreements remained in full force and effect. 10 7 The
court analyzed the history of the relationship beginning with the execu-
tion of a three-store development agreement in 1988 that never led to the
development of any restaurants and was later superseded by a 1994 three-
store development agreement that expressly stated that it superseded and
replaced the 1988 development agreement. Also, as explained previ-
ously, the parties executed a license agreement that was purportedly for a
single restaurant to be operated in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The fran-
chisee developed two restaurants in the Albuquerque area during the en-
suing twelve-month period, but never signed a second license agreement.
In 2000, the parties executed an amendment to the development agree-
ment, which stated that it was an amendment to the 1988 agreement and
extended the franchisee's development rights to November 2001. The
franchisee failed to pursue additional development and sought an exten-
sion of its development rights as it got closer to November 2001. The
104. Tex. Taco Cabana, L.P. v. Taco Cabana of N.M., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 903, 906
(W.D. Tex. 2003) (explaining the court's rulings on motion to dismiss). For a thorough
discussion of round one, see Deborah S. Coldwell et al., Franchise Law, 57 SMU L. REV.
1035, 1055-57 (2004).
105. Tex. Taco Cabana L.P. v. Taco Cabana of N.M., Inc., No. Civ. A. SA-02-CV-1209,
2004 WL 2106527, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2004). For a discussion of round two, see
Deborah S. Coldwell et al., Franchise Law, 58 SMU L. REv. 919, 942-43 (2005). The fran-
chisee argued violations of the DTPA based on the franchisor refusing to cooperate in
development under an amendment to one of their franchise agreements, falsely claiming
that a development agreement did not exist, refusing to acknowledge franchisees' continu-
ing development rights, and defaulting under and threatening to terminate a license
agreement.




franchisor refused to grant an extension and litigation ensued. The court
ultimately found in round three that no valid development rights existed
under the 1988 or 1994 development agreements, but there was an issue
of fact concerning whether any development rights existed under the ex-
isting license agreement, which the court found was still valid. 108
In round four, the court focused on the 1994 license agreement, which
provided that the franchisor would not operate a restaurant within a two-
mile radius of the licensed business "site" in Albuquerque. 10 9 However,
since there was a blank preceding "Albuquerque, New Mexico" in the
license agreement and the franchisee had ostensibly been permitted to
operate two restaurants in Albuquerque under the single license agree-
ment, the franchisee argued that the license agreement gave it the exclu-
sive right to operate restaurants within all of Albuquerque. The court
rejected this argument, finding that the blank was included to eventually
provide a specific address for a restaurant, and the fact that the franchisor
did not fill in the blank or obtain the execution of another franchise
agreement for the second restaurant did not constitute a waiver or prove
that the single license agreement was intended to cover all restaurants in
an entire city.110
B. ANTITRUST
In Schlotzsky's, Ltd. v. Sterling Purchasing & National Distribution
Co.,1 11 which was discussed earlier, a restaurant-supply chain manager
brought suit against the new owners of the Schlotzsky's Deli restaurant
system alleging, among other things, antitrust violations following
Schlotzsky's termination of the supply chain manager's right to serve as a
non-exclusive supply chain manager for the Schlotzsky's Deli restaurant
system. The assets associated with the Schlotzsky's Deli restaurant sys-
tem had been sold to the new owners through a bankruptcy-court-ap-
proved sale in December 2004. Before the sale, Schlotzsky's
management had approved Sterling as a non-exclusive supply-chain man-
ager for the Schlotzsky's Restaurant system, but stated in the approval
letter that Schlotzsky's alone had "full right and authority to review and
approve all Products to be used in the Schlotzsky's restaurant system and
all Suppliers and distributors of Products who sell Products to Franchis-
ees for use in the Schlotzsky's Restaurant system," and that the approval
of Sterling was revocable at any time. 112
The new owners of Schlotzsky's sought to restructure their purchasing
and distribution system following the acquisition, and in April 2005 noti-
fied Sterling that their designation as an approved supply-chain manager
for the Schlotzsky's franchise system would be revoked effective in June
108. Id. at *1-7.
109. Tex. Taco Cabana L.P., 2005 WL 1397032, at *7.
110. Id. at *17-24.




2005. Schlotzsky's also brought suit against Sterling claiming damages re-
lated to certain aspects of the existing and prior relationship between the
two parties. Sterling filed counterclaims and an application for a prelimi-
nary injunction to stop Schlotzsky's from revoking its status as an ap-
proved supply-chain manager. Among the counterclaims was an action
for declaratory judgment that Sterling was free to act as a distribution
and purchasing agent for the Schlotzsky's franchisees without Schlotz-
sky's approval, and that the Schlotzsky's franchisees were free to
purchase products and arrange delivery through any distributor they
choose. The court reviewed the supplier provisions from a sampling of
Schlotzsky's franchise agreements and found that Schlotzsky's, as
franchisor, had the right to set quality standards for the supplies used in
the franchise system, and that the franchisees were required to purchase
supplies only from the franchisor or from approved sources of supply.
Accordingly, the court ruled that Sterling was not likely to succeed on the
merits of its declaratory-judgment counterclaim. 113
C. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
1. Non-Competition Agreement Enforced
In In re Schlotzsky's Inc., v. Titterington's Deli Co.,11 4 a federal bank-
ruptcy court in San Antonio granted a preliminary injunction in favor of
the Schlotzsky's Deli restaurant system franchisor, prohibiting a group of
former Colorado franchisees from operating restaurants in violation of
their post-termination non-competition obligations. Schlotzsky's and its
affiliates had filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code in August 2004. Shortly thereafter, a group of eight franchis-
ees operating twelve Schlotzsky's restaurants in the Denver, Colorado
area gave Schlotzsky's notice that they were unilaterally terminating their
franchise agreements. Despite the attempted unilateral termination,
Schlotzsky's submitted evidence at the preliminary-injunction hearing in
the bankruptcy court that each of the former restaurants continued using
all or a portion of the Schlotzsky's trademarks, tradenames, proprietary
information, and operating system after terminating their agreements,
and were also advertising in their restaurants that they were converting
from the Schlolzsky's brand to a new restaurant chain named "Denver
Deli."
The court found that Schlotzsky's satisfied all four prerequisites for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction: (1) a showing of immediate and ir-
reparable harm that may not be remedied through monetary damages,
(2) a showing that there is a likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on
the merits, (3) a showing that in balancing the equities, the harm to the
plaintiff in not granting relief is greater than the harm to the defendant in
granting it, and (4) a showing that injunctive relief is supported by public
113. Id.
114. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 12,941.
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policy.11 5 First, the court noted that the irreparable harm to Schlotzsky's
was worse with each passing day because the community was getting ac-
customed to the idea that the restaurants were part of a new restaurant
chain and that they were authorized to use the franchisor's trademark
and proprietary information.116 The court also found that the harm was
not compensable in monetary damages and was increased because the
franchisor was undergoing a reorganization in bankruptcy. 17 Second, the
court found that Schlotzsky's was likely to succeed on the merits of its
claim that the former franchisees were violating non-competition cove-
nants in their agreements by continuing to offer and sell similar food
products and to display the franchisor's trademarks and trade dress after
terminating their agreements. 118 Third, the court found that the balanc-
ing of the harms favored granting the injunction because the continued
display of Schlotzsky's intellectual property and use of its proprietary in-
formation amounted to simple theft, and although the former franchisees
would be put out of business by an injunction, the court focused on the
tenuous status of the Schlotzsky's system while in bankruptcy to find the
balance favored Schlotzsky's. 119 Finally, the court noted that the former
franchisees could make a living without using Schlotzsky's trade dress
and property, but public policy could not allow the franchisees' actions to
endanger the bankruptcy reorganization prospects for the entire Schlotz-
sky's franchise system.120
In Loye v. Travelhost, Inc.,121 a former distributor of the Travelhost
magazine appealed the grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of
Travelhost enjoining the former distributor from violating a non-compete
clause in their distribution agreement. Loye was the sole shareholder and
director of Little Bit Productions, which signed a distributorship agree-
ment with Travelhost in December 2002 to distribute Travelhost
magazines in the Bossier City and Shreveport area. Loye had several
independent contractors working with him to help distribute the
Travelhost magazine, but stopped distributing it in September 2003 and
started publishing a new magazine, On the Go in the Ark-La-Tex, which
began publication from the same office space occupied by the Travelhost
operation and was manned by several of the same independent contrac-
tors. These independent contractors also switched several advertisers and
magazine carriers from Travelhost magazine to On the Go in the Ark-La-
Tex. Travelhost brought an action for injunctive relief under the agree-
ment's non-competition provisions. The injunction was granted and, on
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pete was unenforceable as a matter of law. 122 The Dallas Court of Ap-
peals declined to decide the merits of whether the covenant was
enforceable, but found a substantial likelihood of success on the merits
and declined to overrule the trial court's granting of the injunction.123
VII. REMEDIES: DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
In Springs Window Fashions Division, Inc. v. Blind Maker, Inc., 124
Springs Window Fashions Division, Inc., Springs Window Fashions, L.P.,
and SWF, Inc. appealed a judgment awarding Blind Maker $5,167,240 in
actual damages and $2,090,000 in exemplary damages. Springs manufac-
tured blinds and similar window coverings. Springs distributed its prod-
ucts through two methods: (1) large retail outlets, such as Home Depot
and Lowe's; and (2) distributors and fabricators. The underlying dispute
arose from Springs' relationship with one of its fabricators, Blind
Maker.125
For over fourteen years, Springs and Blind Maker did business without
a written contract-Blind Maker would order Springs' components as
needed, Springs would invoice Blind Maker, and Blind Maker would pay.
Blind Maker did not pay timely, yet Springs always allowed Blind Maker
a discount as if it had paid on time. In 1997, Springs and Blind Maker
entered into their first formal credit agreement at Springs' request. The
credit agreement provided that Blind Maker would make payments nec-
essary to keep the account balance within the terms that Springs estab-
lished. In 1998, Springs introduced its fabricator license agreement,
which granted fabricators a limited license to use one of Springs' brand
name trademarks, provided they adhered to quality standards. 126
Blind Maker believed (and tried its cased against Springs on the the-
ory) that Springs committed a variety of fraudulent acts in furtherance of
a plan to take over existing fabricators, move the fabrication process to
Mexico, and utilize the prior fabricators as distributors. This plan was
termed Project Overlord. Blind Maker alleged that Springs' plan to im-
plement Project Overlord (and therefore extract business from the
fabricators) was so evident that Springs' even advertised it in a review
form following a fabricator's conference. The review form stated that
"We will be driven to execute OVERLORD on an accelerated basis."1 27
After Springs terminated Blind Maker's agreement, Blind Maker filed
suit against Springs, asserting fraud, breach of contract, negligence, and a
host of other claims. Springs counterclaimed under the agreement for
$2.3 million, Blind Maker's remaining credit balance. Before submission
122. Id. at 619-20.
123. Id. at 620-22.
124. 184 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. granted).
125. Id. at 851.
126. Id. at 852.
127. Id. at 856-57.
2006] 1375
SMU LAW REVIEW
to the jury, Blind Maker dismissed with prejudice all of its claims except
fraud. Blind Maker submitted only past and future lost profits. The jury
found that Springs had committed fraud and awarded Blind Maker
$5,157,240 in past lost profits; it awarded no future lost profits. The jury
further found that the harm to Blind Maker resulted in fraud and
awarded $2,090,000 in exemplary damages (analyzed below). The jury
also found that Blind Maker failed to comply with its payment obligations
under the agreement and awarded Springs $2,043,660. Springs
appealed.' 28
Springs asserted that the evidence did not legally or factually support
the jury's finding of fraud. In reviewing the factual challenge, the appel-
late court considered, weighed, and examined all the evidence presented
at trial. Springs' argument was predicated on the jury's failure to find in
Blind Maker's favor on its fraudulent-inducement defense to Springs'
counterclaims. The appellate court, consequently, considered only poten-
tial evidence that was not "inducement-related" to determine whether
fraud could be found without inducement. Blind Maker suggested that
Springs was attempting to revive an argument, waived at trial, that the
jury's findings in Question 1 (fraud) and Question 6 (fraudulent induce-
ment) fatally conflicted. The appellate court agreed that Springs had
waived this argument.129 The appellate court, likewise, rejected Springs'
contract, tort, white-sale, and customer-list arguments to support its the-
ory that the evidence was factually insufficient. 130
Springs also challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the jury's
$5,167,240 award as actual damages. The appellate court explained that
after the jury received its instructions, it was asked to consider only a
single element of damages-lost profits. The appellate court observed
that "lost profits may be recovered as fraud damages either as direct
damages or consequential damages. ' 131 Blind Maker sought lost profits
solely as consequential damages, that is, damages arising from business
opportunities due to Springs' fraud. The appellate court held that when
determining whether legally and factually sufficient evidence of past con-
sequential lost-profits damages supports the jury's award, the court was
mindful of the following: (1) lost profits must not be confused with eco-
nomic gains or losses that are a mere component of a lost-profits calcula-
tion; (2) recovery of lost profits must be predicated on one complete
calculation, although there is no one correct method for calculating lost
profits; and (3) to recover lost profits, by whatever method calculated,
"the amount of the loss must be shown by competent evidence with rea-
sonable certainty. ' 132
128. Id. at 862.
129. Id. at 866.
130. Id. at 864-67.
131. Id. at 882.
132. Id. at 883-84.
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The appellate court held that because it did not make one complete
calculation to determine lost profits, Blind Maker's calculation was le-
gally and factually insufficient to support the jury's award. Blind Maker
mistakenly relied on the principle that a business operating at a loss could
recover lost profits from specific lost business opportunities, regardless of
whether the company is making an overall profit. The appellate court
noted that while Blind Maker conceivably could have recovered lost prof-
its from specific lost business opportunities in an amount that exceeded
its overall average net profits, that was not the "one complete calcula-
tion" that Blind Maker made. 133 The appellate court held that it could
not speculate that any of Blind Maker's loss figures were comprised of
lost profits from specific lost sales and business opportunities, as Blind
Maker made no attempt to distinguish the portion of its losses attributa-
ble to lost profit on sales from other damages.134 Consequently, the ap-
pellate court held that Blind Maker had incurred lost profits based on
two measures-$616,510 in lost executive salaries and lost overall profits
and $1,270,952 in lost sales attributable to Blind Maker's customer-list
claim. 135
B. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In Springs Window Fashions, the appellate court suggested a remittitur
after finding that the evidence did not support an award of over $5 mil-
lion in actual damages. 136 The appellate court held that when suggesting
a remittitur regarding actual damages, the court must reevaluate the
jury's award of exemplary damages. 137 To ensure that exemplary dam-
ages were not "grossly disproportional," the appellate court considered
(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct, (2) the
disparity between the actual and potential harm suffered by the plaintiff
and the punitive damages award, and (3) the difference between the pu-
nitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties awarded or
imposed in other comparable cases.1 38 The appellate court stated that the
most important of these considerations was the degree of reprehensibility
of the defendant's misconduct. 139
In evaluating the jury's award of exemplary damages, the appellate
court observed that Blind Maker sufficiently proved that Springs imple-
mented Project OVERLORD and sustained its implementation over the
course of several years. Moreover, the jury found existence of fraud con-
cerning the agreement, and the evidence connected that fraud to Project
OVERLORD and Springs' subsequent activities. Further, there was evi-
dence of Springs' misuse of Blind Maker's customer list after Springs
133. Id. at 884.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 887-88.






gave assurances that the information would be kept confidential and
would only be used by a third-party administrator. As such, the appellate
court found that the award of $2,090,000 to be reasonable. 140
C. INJUNCrIVE RELIEF
Courts not only enforce settlement agreements, but also enforce in-
junctive relief agreed to by the parties. In C & C Franchising, Inc. v.
Poindexter,141 the district court ordered that defendants Norred
Poindexter, Julia Palmer, and Piedmont Eastern, Inc. be permanently en-
joined from violating any post-termination provisions in the franchise
agreement to which the defendants were a party.1 42
140. Id. at 891.
141. No. 04-02307, 2004 WL 3328890 (Tex. Dist. Nov. 4, 2004, no pet. h.).
142. Id. at *1.
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